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Abstract
Media providers frequently have to trade-off revenues from advertisers and subscribers. However, with contemporary
electronic media, such as Internet websites, there exists the possibility of giving viewers of the same program the option to pay a
higher price and view fewer advertisements, or pay a lower price but view more advertisements. With heterogeneous
consumers, there will be some takers for both options, thereby allowing the media provider to derive the advantages of both
subscription and advertising revenues. In this paper, we examine the number of options, the subscription price and the amount
of advertising that should be offered to consumers. We find conditions where a pure advertiser-supported strategy or a pure pay-
per-view strategy can be optimal. However, except under specified conditions, the optimal strategy is to charge a subscription
price and have advertisements, but offer options to consumers.
D 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Advertising and media share a symbiotic relation-
ship. Whereas advertising revenue sponsors media
content, it is the content that makes the consumption
of advertising palatable to consumers (Owen & Wild-
man, 1992). Television broadcasting, for example, has
traditionally been wholly advertiser sponsored. The
situation was encouraged by the technical difficulty of
collecting revenues from subscribers while simulta-
neously denying access to nonpaying viewers (Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, 1994; Owen & Wildman, 1992).
However, media such as the Internet and cable-pro-
vided services have largely overcome this difficulty,
resulting in a greater emphasis on subscriber gener-
ated revenues (Artzt, 1994).
The media provider has to balance the revenue from
advertising and subscription. For any program, higher
subscription prices result in fewer consumers and,
consequently, in lower advertising revenue. On the
other hand, the amount of revenue that can be raised
from advertising is also limited since a large number of
advertisements will turn off consumers. However, with
contemporary electronic media, media providers can
inexpensively design and offer several price-advertis-
ing choices to consumers, and the managerial decision
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Intern. J. of Research in Marketing 20 (2003) 13–30is not restricted to setting a single price and advertising
level. Consider the following examples:
‘‘The slack ad market and overall economic
slump has forced many dot-coms and New
Economy publications out of business... Some
Internet magazines have tried to dodge a bullet by
adopting subscription models or becoming in-
creasingly flexible with their ad formats...Others
have turned to paid ad-free services. In April,
Salon launched a subscription service called
Salon Premium, which lets customers choose an
ad-free format. After 11 weeks the company said
it had amassed more than 10,000 subscribers’’.
(Olsen, 2001a)
‘‘Slashdot.org, the ‘‘news for nerds’’ web site
popular among software developers and Linux
fans, said this week that it plans to use larger ads
and offer a subscription service. When Slashdot
increases ad sizes, it plans to introduce a
subscription service for people who want to pay
for an ad-free version...The cost of the service
has yet to be determined’’. (Mariano, 2001)
In these examples, advertising is used as a source of
revenue and for segmenting the market into groups
that differ in their utility for advertising-free programs.
Segmenting the market offers two potential advan-
tages. First, additional revenues are obtained by charg-
ing different prices to different customer segments.
Second, advertisers may be willing to pay different
advertising rates for advertising to different segments.
Thus, the media provider can price discriminate on
both the consumer side and the advertiser side.
By the term ‘media provider’, we refer to a variety
of firms. Consider the following examples of elec-
tronic media and the ways in which they have applied
the advertising-subscriber trade-off:
  Telephone: Mitchell (1997) reports the use of
advertising sponsored telephone calls in Sweden.
The subscribers of this service agree to have their
long distance calls interrupted by commercials in
exchange for making the call for free. In the US, a
similar Seattle-based company, FreeFone, subsi-
dizes or pays subscribers for listening to ads
(Kalakota & Whinston, 1996, p. 479).
  Voicemail and e-mail services: In these, the
customer is provided with a free service subject
to being targeted or interrupted by ads while using
the service.
  Internet: In 2001, online advertising spending was
projected to be about $6 billion (Olsen, 2001b).I n
Internet marketing, there are pay-as-you-go pricing
schemes where customers are subsidized if they
click on an advertisers’ icon or fill out a question-
naire. For example, Cybergold and Netincentives
offered merchandise coupons and cash to surfers
who agreed to look at advertisements. Cybergold
dollars could then be redeemed at participating
merchant sites.
1 Two Cybergold advertisements are
shown in Fig. 1.
  Video-on-Demand: Video-on-Demand is an inter-
active service that allows subscribers to order
movies on their television but retain full video
functionality such as rewind and fast-forward. A
cable operator, Stargazer, offers discounts on
video-on-demand if customers view advertise-
ments or fill out personal information question-
naires at the beginning of the movie.
In all of these examples, there is a trade-off between
the subscription price and the amount of advertising.
The Internet example is particularly explicit. Taking
advantage of the Internet as an interactive media, pay-
as-you-go schemes allow viewers to select their own
exposure to ads. By viewing from a large selection of
ads, viewers can precisely determine their discount
and, therefore, the price they pay.
Fig.2illustratesthetworevenuesourcesforamedia
provider, advertising and subscribers, and shows the
interrelationships that are common to all the preceding
examples.
There are three relevant groups of decision makers.
They are the consumers, the advertisers, and the
media provider. Consumers maximize their utility by
selecting from the options presented to them by the
media provider. Advertisers decide whether to adver-
tise or not advertise based on the advertising rates
charged by the media provider. The media provider
1 (Cybergold closed operations recently; other websites that pay
for viewing ads include http://www.adsenger.com, http://www.spe-
dia.net, http://www.clickdough.com, http://www.paybar.com, and
http://www.adbroadcast.com.)
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making its own decisions. For the media provider,
there are three types of decisions to make:
  Revenue issues: To what extent should the program
depend on advertiser revenue versus subscriber
revenue? When, if ever, is it optimal for a media
provider to implement a pure pay-per-view strat-
egy, or a pure advertiser-supported strategy?
  Subscriber market issues: How should the market
be segmented and what choices of price-advertis-
ing levels should the media provider provide
consumers?
  Advertiser market issues: At what rates should
access to the segments be sold to advertisers?
The purpose of this paper is to develop an
analytical model to establish normative guidelines
for media managers facing these issues. The media
provider’s problem has not been examined in detail
in the marketing literature. Historically, issues of
advertiser and subscriber supported services have
been studied by media economists in the context of
the radio and television broadcast industries (Ander-
son & Coate, 2000; Beebe, 1977; Samuelson, 1964;
Steiner, 1952). The main results from this literature
are that a competitive market may not produce either
sufficient diversity or a welfare maximizing supply
of programming. This literature does not examine the
role of advertising as a price discrimination mecha-
nism.
Fig. 2. Revenue sources for media provider.
Fig. 1. Cybergold ads.
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to electronic media. However, one could argue that the
idea of subsidizing media content is not really new.
Traditional media also obtain revenues from adver-
tisers and subscribers. Magazine publishers often sell
subscriptions at very cheap rates. The price paid for
many magazines and newspapers does not even cover
their costs of printing and distribution. Obviously,
these magazines make their money from advertising.
However, electronic technology gives media managers
a simple and inexpensive way to provide customers
with a large number of price and advertising options,
instantaneously if required, in comparison to tradi-
tional media such as newspapers and magazines. This
feature is essential for incorporating the price discrim-
ination strategies to be discussed shortly. In the
extreme case, it is possible to mass-customize the
amount of advertisements and price paid for the
service on interactive media. Lack of these opportu-
nities in traditional media perhaps explains why the
problem has not been studied earlier. The present
study is particularly relevant given the rapid growth
of electronic media and the need for work in this area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The
next section lays out the conceptual underpinnings of
the model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the model
description and the analysis, respectively. Section 5
is a discussion of the results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual underpinnings
In this section, we obtain the demand functions of
consumers and advertisers. In the next section, we will
use these functions as input in the maximization
program of the media provider.
2.1. Consumer model
For consumers, ads are an unwelcome intrusion.
Consumer efforts at avoiding exposure to ads include
zipping of commercials for programs that are recorded
on video tapes, and zapping, i.e. changing channels
when commercials are aired, or physically moving
away (Stout & Burda, 1989). For a review of this
literature, see Bellamy and Walker (1996).Zippingand
zapping are clear indications of customer dissatisfac-
tion with advertisements. Estimates of ads zipped on
video playback range from 20% to 60% of all ads
(Bellamy & Walker, 1996). It is therefore assumed that
customers dislike advertisements to varying degrees.
2
An explanation for avoidance of commercials is
based on the viewers’ opportunity cost of time (Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, 1994; Narasimhan, 1984). Viewers
are dissatisfied because they could have been doing
something more worthwhile than watching ads. It is
commonly assumed that income is a good proxy for
opportunity cost. As Krattenmaker and Powe (1994, p.
41) note, a person who earns $150 an hour would
probablybewillingtorenta2-hvideoofamovierather
thanwatcha21/2-hfreepresentationofthemoviewith
commercials. A similar explanation is given by Nar-
asimhan (1984) to explain the use of coupons as price
discrimination devices. It is more likely that higher
income customers have less advantage from cutting
and managing coupons for their purchases, and there-
fore, low-income customers use coupons, whereas
high-income customers pay the full price.
We consider two customer types,
3 high and low.
Based on the arguments above, they correspond to
high- and low-income customers, respectively. Al-
though a stylized representation of heterogeneity, the
two-segment assumption yields insights generalizable
to many segments. (Furthermore, by making one seg-
ment of size zero, our results apply to a homogeneous
audience. Homogeneity can occur in practice if the
program is strongly targeted to a specific group of
viewers). High-segment customers are those who are
willing to pay more for an increase in program quality
in comparison to low segment customers, where qual-
ity is defined as the intrinsic value of the programming
content less the amount of advertising. Thus, quality is
q ¼ T   a ð1Þ
where az0 is the amount of advertising and Tz0i s
the useful programming content. We operationalize a
2 We do not examine media such as TV shopping channels,
classifieds and yellow pages where the advertising is the infor-
mation and viewers willingly subject themselves to it. It is evident
that in these cases, more advertising is always better. A similar
logic extends to cases where viewers appreciate advertising up to a
threshold and dislike it thereafter. Advertising should always be
provided up to the threshold and the decision on incremental
advertisements beyond that is then the subject of this study.
3 The words ‘type’ and ‘segment’ are used interchangeably.
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menttakesaunitamountoftimeorspaceasdetermined
by the context. The content Tis also converted into the
sameunits.Forexample,ifacabletelevisionchannelis
showing a 90-min movie with 30 min of advertise-
ments and each advertisement takes 30 s, it is straight
forward to calculate that a=60, T=180 and q=120.
Consumers’ utility functions are given by
Uiðq;psiÞ¼ViðqÞ psi; iaL;H: ð2Þ
The i subscript denotes the two segments, low (L)
and high (H). The function Vi(q) is the valuation, or
maximum willingness-to-pay, for program content of
quality q. The subscription price customers are
required to pay is denoted psi. Quasi-linear utility
functions are commonly seen in the literature due to
desirable properties such as the absence of income
effects (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). A linear specifi-
cation for Vi(q) is selected for analysis:
UiðT   a;psiÞ¼hiðT   aÞ psi; i ¼ L;H ð2aÞ
High-type customers value an improvement in
programming quality more, therefore, hH>hL.T h e
preference for advertising is illustrated graphically in
Fig. 3.
2.2. Advertiser model
The advertisers’ willingness to advertise depends
on their value and cost from advertising to customers.
Customer segments are of differential value to adver-
tisers and, ceteris paribus, high-income customers
tend to be preferred (Kalita & Ducoffe, 1995; Nar-
asimhan, 1984). This is because high-income custom-
ers are more likely to have disposable income to
spend on the advertised products.
To obtain the advertising demand function, let us
suppose there are M firms having products that they
are potentially interested in advertising. We assume
that the profit margin of each product is indexed by a
parameter s drawn from a uniform distribution on
[0,r]. Thus, the density is given by f(s)=1/r and the
distribution is FðsÞ¼m
s
0 f ðxÞdx ¼ s=r. Let NH and NL
denote the size of high- and low-income viewers,
respectively. For any product, it is assumed that high
types are more likely to purchase the advertised
product than low types. Specifically, for each product,
a high-income viewer will purchase the product with
probability w, whereas a low-income viewer will have
a probability kw, where k<1 (Anderson & Coate,
2000). (However, note that although it is unlikely to
be the case in practice, all the analysis will go through
unchanged if kz1.) Given that the probability of
purchase does not change with the number of adver-
tisements, the number of advertisers is equal to the
number of advertisements. This completes the
description of the advertising market.
4
A firm selling a product at profit margin s will be
willing to pay sw to contact a high-type viewer and
ksw to contact a low-type viewer. A firm that does not
advertise gets a payoff of zero. The advertiser who is
just indifferent between advertising and not advertis-
ing is denoted s*, and can be identified by equating
the expected profit from advertising against the cost
of advertising, i.e. NHws*+N Lkws*=(NH+N L)pa
where the advertising rate per person is denoted pa.
All firms with higher margins than the indifferent
advertiser will advertise. The number of such firms is
M[1 F(s*)]. Inserting the value of s*, we obtain the
demand function:









Other than the indifferent advertiser who obtains
zero surplus, the remaining advertisers obtain a pos-
Fig. 3. Utility (Preference) for advertising for customer segments.
4 It is a straightforward extension to introduce additional
parameters to capture additional factors that influence purchase
probability w such as advertising effectiveness, zipping and zapping.
Similarly, the quantity of purchases can be included in s. Since these
factors are not our primary focus, we essentially assume that they are
constant.
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amount of advertising decreases if the advertising rate
per person, pa, increases as we would expect. The
advertising rate per person is:
pa ¼ rw 1  
a
M




If segments view separate programs, then the
advertising rates for access to the segments are differ-
ent. The advertising rates per person for high- and
low-income consumers are, respectively:










From k<1, it can be seen that paH>paL, i.e. advertisers
pay a higher rate per person to access high-income
customers. Furthermore, the advertising rate increases
with the number of potential advertisers M. Having
developed the consumers’ and advertisers’ models in
this section, we can now turn our attention to model-
ing the media provider’s problem.
3. Model
Observe that each consumer yields a profit equal to
the sum of the subscription price he or she pays and
the amount that advertisers are willing to pay for him
or her. The total profit is obtained by adding the
profits across all consumers. Costs in electronic media
are mainly fixed costs such as the cost for buying or
developing programming content. The variable cost of
serving each additional consumer is negligible since
duplication and transmission of content is both high
quality and costless in electronic media.
We consider four strategies that the media provider
might pursue. These are labeled limited access, free
access, pooling and separating. The pooling and sepa-
rating terminology is borrowed from the signaling
literature but is also appropriate here. A pooling strat-
egy is one where all customers accept the available
option (ps,a) where ps is the subscription price and ais
the amount of advertising. In a separating strategy,
customersinthetwosegmentschoosedifferentoptions
(psH, aH) and (psL, aL). In limited access, the low-
incomesegmentdoesnotparticipatebecausethemedia
provider sets a very high subscription price, while in
free access, the high types prefer not to participate due
to the large amount of advertising contained in the
program, even though the program is free or pays the
viewers (hence the name ‘free access’). The possible
strategies and profit functions are shown in Table 1.
In a separating strategy, the media provider cannot
identify and charge segments their maximum willing-
ness-to-pay and achieve a ‘first best’ price discrim-
ination. However, by designing an appropriate set of
options, it can make customers self-select their pre-
ferred subscription price and advertising level (Moor-
thy, 1984). This self-selection feature is known as
incentive compatibility (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).
There is an extensive theoretical literature in market-
ing and economics on price discrimination (e.g.
Dolan, 1987; Maskin & Riley, 1984; Moorthy,
1984; Narasimhan, 1984; Oi, 1971). A related liter-
ature focuses on methods for designing a product line
(Dobson & Kalish, 1988; Moorthy, 1984; Reibstein &
Gatignon, 1984) sometimes using conjoint method-
ology. The purpose of conjoint is to provide individ-
ual or segment level utilities, i.e. the value of the
parameters in Eq. (2a). Thereafter, the design of the
best list of options for the consumer to select from
must be obtained using analytical results, as provided
in this paper.
To analyze the problem requires finding an equili-
brium, i.e. a situation in which consumers, advertisers
and the media provider are all making the best
decision given what the other players are doing. The
profit functions listed in Table 1 have to be maximized
by the media provider with respect to the decision
variables and constrained by the reactions of the
consumers and the advertisers.
Table 1
Alternative strategies
Sell to one segment Sell to both segments






Offer two options Separating
P4=NH(psH+paHaH)+
NL(psL+paLaL)
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In this section, the optimal characterization of the
four strategies discussed in the preceding section are
obtained.
4.1. Limited access and free access
Limited access means that only the high-segment
customers are provided access to the service through
charging a high subscription price. A decision on the
amount of advertising implicitly determines the adver-











s:t: IRH: hHðT   aÞ psz0 ð5aÞ
and Mzaz0 ð5bÞ
The constraint IRH ensures that the high types
participate. For the low segment to not participate
and the high types to participate, i.e. hH(T a) 
psz0>hL(T a) ps, it must be the case that T>a
since otherwise hL(T a)zhH(T a). This imposes
an upper bound on the amount of advertising that can
be shown under limited access. Nonnegativity con-
straints on prices are not required since there is no
limitation to prevent the media provider from paying
subscribers and advertisers if that happens to be
optimal. However, it can intuitively be seen that
paying advertisers to advertise cannot be optimal
because this decreases both advertising revenue and
subscription revenue.
Since only the high types are served, they should
be charged to the maximum extent they are willing to
pay. Hence, we get
ps ¼ hHðT   aÞ: ð6Þ
Substituting Eq. (6) into (5) and maximizing the
resulting profit function, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: In the optimal ‘Limited Access’
strategy, the media provider offers subscription price
and advertising level (ps, a). The high-segment
customers select this option and the low segment
customers select the outside option. Where:
(i) If T>M(rw hH)/2rw then ps=hH(T a),
where if rwVhH then a=0 and P1=N HhHT,







(ii) If TVM(rw hH)/2rw then a!T and ps!0.
The profit is P1=N HrwT(1 T/M).
(All proofs in Appendix A).
Part (i) of the proposition, for programs of high
intrinsic quality T, says that revenue should always be
generated from subscription but that revenue from
advertising may or may not be appropriate depending
on the segment’s dislike for advertising. If the dislike
for advertising is sufficiently high, i.e. if hH is larger
than rw, the media provider should rely on subscrip-
tion revenue alone.
Part (ii) of the proposition considers the case where
the optimal solution a=M (rw hH)/2rw cannot be
reached due to the necessity of T>a to keep out the
low types. Ideally, the media provider would like to
increase advertising and then have a zero or negative
subscription price. However, in this case, it is not
possible to exclude the low types based on self-
selection since they have less disutility for advertise-
ments than high types and will be overcompensated
by being paid to view the program. If external criteria
such as demographics can be used to screen the types
then self-selection is not required and one can offer
special invitations to the high types only while block-
ing the participation of low types. As an example of
this scenario, consider Free-PC. In 1999, a company,
Free-PC, offered to give away PCs to selected Internet
surfers who agreed to use the company’s Internet
service, share demographic information and agree to
view targeted advertisements on their desktops.
When only the low-income segment participates,
we have free access, a complement to the previous
strategy when T<a. In this case, the objective is:
Max





s:t: IRL: hLðT   aÞ psz0 ð7aÞ
and Mzaz0 ð7bÞ
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Proposition 2: In the optimal ‘Free Access’
strategy, the media provider offers subscription price
and advertising level (ps, a). The low-income segment
selects this option and the high-segment customers
select the outside option. Where:
(i)If T<M(rwk hL)/2rwk then ps=hL






(ii) If TzM(rwk hL)/2rwk then a!T and ps!0.
The profit is P2=N LrwkT(1 T/M).
Several examples of this strategy that requires
viewers to see a large number of advertisements in
return for payment can be found on the Internet. They
include payment for receiving and reading emails by
advertisers (e.g. http://www.yoyomail.com, http://
www.mintmail.com and http://www.Htmail.com), lis-
tening to radio ads (e.g. http://www.cashradio.com),
and being paid to surf different websites (e.g. http://
www.epipo.com, http://www.clickdough.com).
4.2. Pooling
In a pooling strategy, a single version of the
program is once again offered but this time, it is
targeted for consumption by both high and low seg-
ments. Using Eq. (4), the objective is:
Max
ps;a










s:t: IRH: hHðT   aÞ psz0 ð8aÞ
IRL: hLðT   aÞ psz0 ð8bÞ
and Mzaz0 ð8cÞ
Observe that if T>a and if the low types get more
utility from participating, the high type will certainly
participate as well. When T<a, as long as the high
types participate, the low types will also participate. In
setting the subscription price, the media provider will
select the highest price at which both segments
participate. Thus,
ps ¼
hLðT   aÞ a < T
0 a ¼ T
hHðT   aÞ a > T
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
ð9Þ
The result that the participation constraint of either
type may bind under the appropriate circumstances is
new, since invariably in the mechanism design liter-
ature, the high types participate if the low types do.
Consider what this result implies for the ‘high’ and
‘low’ terminology we use, since the high-type viewer
does not have higher value for the program when T<a
since in this case hH(T a)<hL(T a). However, the
high types are willing to pay more for an improvement
in program quality than are low types. This is known
as the ‘single-crossing’ property and it is this property
that defines high-type customers (Fudenberg & Tirole,
1991, p. 259).
5 This is consistent with our behavioral
interpretation of high types having greater opportunity
cost of time because reducing advertisements saves
them higher costs.
Inserting Eq. (9) into (8) and solving, the results
can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3: An optimal pooling strategy exists
where the media provider selects subscription price
and advertising level (ps, a) and both the high and low
segment customers select this option. Where,
(i) if T>M(rwx hL)/2rwx, then ps=hL(T a)
where (a) if rwx>hL, then a=M(rwx hL)/
2rwx and P3=(NH+N L)[hLT+M ( rwx  hL)
2/
4rwx], and (b) if rwxVhL then a=0 and the
profit to the media provider is P2=(NH+N L)hLT.
(ii) if T<M(rwx hH)/2rwx, then ps=hH(T a),
where a=M(rwx hH)/2rwx. The profit to the
media provider is (NH+N L)[hHT+M(rwx hH)
2/
4rwx].
5 Mathematically, hH > hLZ
BUH=Bq
BUH=Bps
     
      >
BUL=Bq
BUL=Bps
     
      where
BUi=Bq
BUi=Bps
;iaL;H is the marginal rate of substitution between quality and
subscription price (or the slope of the customer’s indifference curve
in (q, ps) space). Hence, a high type customer must be compensated
more than a low segment customer for a given decrease in program
quality.
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provider is (NH+N L)Trwx(1 T/M).
Part (i) of the proposition describes the circum-
stances when a subscription price should be charged.
Theremayormaynotbeadvertising.Theconditionfor
no advertising is rwxVhL. For a value of x close to 1,
e.g. if the advertisements are for necessities that people
of all incomes are equally likely to purchase, it is less
likely that we will observe a purely subscription based
equilibrium. However, if x is close to 0, advertisers do
not advertise and a pure subscriber supported strategy
will be seen.
Fig.4illustratesthepropositiongraphically.Observe
that subscription price can become negative as given
by Proposition 3(ii). This is more likely if program
qualityispoor,advertisersgreatlyvaluecustomers,and
there are a large number of firms ready to advertise.
Proposition 3(iii) describes the situation where the
media provider should obtain all its revenue from
advertising, there is no payment to the viewers, and
neither segment is left with positive surplus. The
profit here dominates that in Propositions 1(ii) and
2(ii). Consequently, those two cases can be safely
ignored.
The best examples of the pooling strategy with pure
advertiser support are broadcast television and radio. If
pooling can be seen as the archetypical strategy of the
traditional media, the next strategy represents the
possibilities of the new electronic media.
4.3. Separating
In a separating strategy, two options (psH, aH) and
(psL, aL) are offered to and accepted by the high types
and the low types, respectively. To implement this
strategy, the firm has to ensure that each customer type
selects the option intended for its type. Knowing that
cannibalizationoftheoptionscanoccur,constraintsare
neededtoensurethateachtypeselectstheoptionmeant
for it. These are known as incentive compatibility (IC)
constraints. Using Eqs. (4a) and (4b), the objective is










w.r.t. (psH, aH) and (psL, aL), subject to constraints
Mzaz0 and:
ICL: hLðT   aHÞ psH V hLðT   aLÞ psL ð10aÞ
ICH: hHðT   aHÞ psH z hHðT   aLÞ psL ð10bÞ
IRL: hLðT   aLÞ psL z 0 ð10cÞ
IRH: hHðT   aHÞ psH z 0 ð10dÞ
Constraints (10a–d) ensure incentive compatibil-
ity for the low and high-income segments, and
Fig. 4. Subscription price and advertising in a pooling strategy.
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NL þ rwk   hL > 0 and
hH>hL/k an optimal separating strategy exists where
the media provider offers options (psH,a H) and (psL,
aL); the high-income segment selects (psH,a H) and the
low-income segment selects (psL,a L). Where,
(i) if T > M
2rwk
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rwk   hL
  
; then psL =
hL(T aL), psH=hH(aL aH)+hL(T aL),
aL ¼
NHðhH hLÞ













then psL=0,p sH=hH(T aH), aL=T and aH=





2rw , then psL=hL(T aL),
psH=hH(T aH), and aH=M(rw hH)/
2rwi frw>hH else 0, aL=(rwk hL)M/2rwk.
(iv) if
Mðrw hHÞ
2rw > Tz M





psL=hL(T aL), psH=0, and aH=T ,a L=
(rwk hL)M/2rwk.
(v) if M





hH(T aH), psL=hL(aL aH)+hH(T aH),
aH ¼
NLðhL hHÞ




The proposition covers the actions that the media
provider should take over the full parameter range.
The intrinsic value of the program T appears to be
particularly relevant in determining the appropriate
strategy. For programs of high intrinsic value, a
subscription-based approach is to be preferred and
for low intrinsic value programs, an advertisement-
based approach. The figure provides a graphical
illustration of the proposition (Fig. 5).
Under a separating strategy, the high-income
customers always pay a higher subscription price
and get to view less advertisements than the low-
income customers. It is thus a requirement that the
low-income segment must always see some adver-
tisements, else both would see no advertisements
and pooling would result. Two conditions are
required to ensure this:
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rwk   hL > 0
and hH>hL/k. When low-income customers are of
very little value to advertisers, so that the latter
condition is violated, it is better for the media
provider not to segment the viewers. Violation of
the former condition resulting in pooling is seen in
the left part of the figure. Observe that as advertisers
value consumers more, the amount of advertising
increases while the subscription price, with some
exceptions, decreases.
Proposition 4(i) shows that it is best to give the
high-income consumers their efficient quality. In
other words, the consumers see a program in which
the amount of advertising is sufficiently small that
they would rather not pay to have it reduced further.
The low-income segment gets less than the quality
they would have preferred. In other words, low-type
customers will probably be dissatisfied with the
amount of advertising they view. Although they
are willing to pay to avoid some advertising, this
option is not made available to them. The reason is
that if low-income customers are provided with too
high a quality, the high-income customers may also
prefer this option instead of the one that was
designed for them. This results in cannibalization
and suboptimal profits. High-income consumers
always prefer the separating strategy to the limited
access strategy since they get the same amount of
advertising but pay a lower price. This may be seen
by noting that the subscription price for the high-
income consumers is lower in a separating equili-
brium than in limited access. The low-income seg-
ment consumers get no surplus and are indifferent
between purchasing the product and any outside
option that they may have.
Proposition 4(v) shows a reverse situation to 4(i).
The high-income segment obtains no surplus and
would be willing to pay to see less advertisements.
The low-income segment does obtain a surplus. The
scenarios 4(ii), 4(iii) and 4(iv) may be grouped toge-
ther. In each of these, the two segments obtain no sur-
plus since they are barely indifferent between viewing
ornotviewingtheprogram.Itmayhappenthatone,but
not both, of the segments obtains the program for free.
4.4. Comparisons of strategies
The following proposition shows that for a range of
parameter values, the separating strategy is best.
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profits to the media provider,
(i) the optimal separating strategy does better than
other strategies if
NHðhH hLÞ




NL þ rwk   hLV0,thereisno advertising
revenueandeitherpoolingorlimitedaccessisbest
depending, respectively, on whether (NH+N L)
hL NHhH is positive or negative.
(iii) If hL/kzhH/x>hH then free access is never
optimal.
The conditions on part (i) are the same as those on
Proposition 4. Hence, this result states that when a
separating strategy exists, it is the best strategy. Note
there is no dominance ordering between the profit
expressions of pooling and limited access or free
access under all circumstances when separating is not
the best strategy. Part (ii) of the proposition shows
that a larger segment size of high types favors limited
access over pooling. Part (iii) shows that if separation
is unprofitable due to the very low valuation of
advertisers for the low types, then free access may
also be inappropriate. Since free access profit is
totally based on what advertisers are willing to pay
for access to the low types, this is an understandable
result.
5. Discussions
To provide normative guidelines for the media
provider, we relate the substance of our findings back
to the research issues and some of the examples from
the introduction.
Revenue issues: The media provider should com-
pute the profits from different strategies for its specific
situation and select the strategy that is most profitable.
Thereafter, the corresponding subscription price and
advertising level should be chosen. From the previous
section, several factors are found to impact the media
provider’s decisions. These include the size of the
segments and their value to the advertiser, the degree
to which customers dislike advertising in comparison
to their dislike for paying subscription, and the pro-
gram quality. In addition, the decisions will depend
upon the degree to which these preferences are
homogeneous or heterogeneous in the population.
Fig. 5. Subscription price and advertising in a separating strategy.
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strategy is optimal only under certain parameter
ranges. Table 2 shows the required conditions, where
separating is presented in two rows, ‘high’ and ‘low’
for the options selected by the high- and low-income
segments, respectively.
Consider first the pure pay-per-view column. The
required condition is a low value of rw in comparison
to the value of h. We know that the former is a
measure of the value of a consumer to advertisers,
whereas the latter is a measure of consumers’ dis-
utility for advertising. Essentially therefore, when
consumers are willing to pay more to avoid advertis-
ing than advertisers are willing to pay to advertise, we
obtain a pay-per-view situation.
A pure advertiser-supported strategy, correspond-
ing to a zero or negative subscription price, can also
be optimal. The main indications that a pure adver-
tiser-supported strategy is optimal are that the adver-
tiser has a high value for consumers and the
programming content T is low quality. In many cases,
it is worthwhile for the media provider to pay con-
sumers to view the program and the advertisements.
Existing free subscription schemes in the broadcast
media will be suboptimal in these cases.
However, a policy where viewers are paid for
viewing ads needs careful implementation to ensure
that viewers opting for this scheme are not able to
accept the money and avoid the ads. For example, use
of Internet ads that viewers can easily click into and
out of are not appropriate. The interactivity of the
Internet is ideal for monitoring behavior to ensure
that viewers indeed view the ads, and this may take
the form of requiring button clicks (e.g. http://www.
adsenger.com, http://www.desktopdollars.com)o r
having ads concurrently showing on screen so that
the viewer cannot avoid them. Payments can be in
digital cash, or alternatively, take the form of tickets
to a lottery draw (e.g. http://www.adbroadcast.com).
Subscriber market issues: To answer the question
of whether to segment or not segment the market
depends on whether the pooling policy provides
higher profits than the other policies, since the remain-
ing strategies treat consumer segments differently.
Proposition 5 provided some conditions when pooling
was optimal, e.g. a relatively large low-type segment
and high valuation by the advertisers for the low
types.
Based on the analysis, consider what suggestions
can be made for the examples for telephone, voice-
mail, etc., mentioned previously. In the case of tele-
phone and voicemail, there is no unique programming
content, therefore, competition from outside options is
higher. The presence of alternatives probably means
that for a new company like Freefone, the number of
low-type users, attracted by the possibility of a lower
price, is high, making a limited access strategy least
preferable and a pooling strategy most preferable. The
lack of unique content implies that advertising rev-
enues will be the major component. For these reasons,
a single option with high advertising content seems
the best strategy.
Internet, cable and video-on-demand all have high
intrinsic programming content. The separating strat-
egy described for slashdot.com and salon.com is
generally appropriate given Proposition 5. A limited
access strategy is most favored if a program provides
high value and if there exists a large high-income
segment. On the other hand, if the program provides
high value, but the low-income segment is large and
all segments have similar preferences, then limited
access is not the best option. When the program is
intrinsically low value, revenues should be obtained
from advertising alone. The best solution may then be
free access to pay the viewers to view the program-
ming content through prizes, sweepstakes and pay-as-
you-go schemes such as Cybergold.
Advertiser market issues: An advantage of the
separating equilibrium is that access to different seg-
ments of consumers can be independently sold to
advertisers at different rates. The advertiser model
Table 2
Conditions for pure advertiser support and pure pay-per-view
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tising rates at which access to the segments should be
sold. If the segments are separately accessible, the
advertising rates are given by Eqs. (4a) and (4b).
Advertisers who are willing to advertise are those
whose products have a higher margin, implying a
higher benefit from advertising. However, in the case
of a separating strategy, there are more advertisers
advertising to the low-income segment, who have an
overall lower probability of purchasing, than to the
high-income segment. Although unintuitive from the
viewpoint of the advertiser, this result occurs because
the media provider controls access to the audience and
enforces a lower level of advertising for the high-
income segment.
A media provider may feel that if different adver-
tising rates can be obtained for different consumer
segments, it would be best to always segment the
market so that access to these different segments can
be separately sold to advertisers. As we saw from
Proposition 5, this turns out to not always be the case.
This means there are situations in which it is not
appropriate to try to mass-customize the viewing
experience.
5.1. The effect of competition
There are three types of competitive effects that
may moderate the results and we proceed to discuss
them individually: These are, (1) the competition
among media providers for viewers, (2) the competi-
tion among media providers for advertisers, and (3)
the competition among advertisers for buyers.
If competition for viewers exists, the competing
media provider provides an outside option to consum-
ers (Rochet & Stole, 1998). Thus, under competition,
the ability to charge higher subscription prices or have
more advertising is reduced. In addition, price dis-
crimination is difficult to incorporate in a competition
setting since price discrimination itself is a realization
of monopoly power. A duopoly result might be
specialization by media providers where each focuses
on serving one of the two segments. The effect of
competition is thus to reduce or prevent price dis-
crimination, i.e. the separating strategy becomes less
attractive.
Competition among media providers for adver-
tisers affects the parameter w, the probability that a
viewer will be influenced to buy the product by
viewing the ad. The argument is that advertisers will
only pay for the incremental probability that advertis-
ing on a media will provide (Wildman, McCullough,
& Kieschnick, 2001). Suppose that, on average, the
same advertisement is seen by a viewer on K com-
peting sites. For an advertiser with profit margin s, the
incremental value of placing an ad on the (K+1)th
site is sw(1 w)
K, i.e. the probability that the influ-
ence was due to this ad and not due to any of the
others. We can refer to wV=w(1 w)
K as the effective
purchase probability.
Fig. 6 shows how even a small number of compet-
ing sites can reduce the effective purchase probability
from a program. Consequently, less can be charged
from advertisers. However, the figure also shows that
the effect is less important when purchase probabilities
are low to start with, which is normally the case. For
example, if one in a hundred viewers purchased the
product, a viewer would have to see the advertisement
on 70 programs before the effective probability is
reduced by half. This indicates that the effect of
competition for advertisements is rather small. Return-
ing to the analysis, the conclusion is that subscriber
support becomes more attractive since the value of
rwV drops in comparison to the value of h.
Regarding competition between advertisers for
buyers, this affects both advertisers’ margins s and
the number of potential advertisers M. In general,
competition will reduce profit margins and under
perfect competition, none of the firms make positive
profit. The net result is that the number of potential
Fig. 6. Effect of K competing providers on effective purchase
probability.
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theamountof advertisinginall cases decreasesas well.
In summary, the latter two types of competition
reduce the amount of advertising revenue, whereas
competition for viewers reduces both the subscription
and advertising revenue. To the extent that different
programming would be quite unique and attract a
distinct audience, it is justifiable to consider a monop-
oly media provider from the point-of-view of the
audience. In that case, competition reduces mainly
advertising revenue. The implication for managers is
that they should examine the possibility of raising
revenue from subscriptions more closely.
6. Conclusions and future research
Media providers operate simultaneously in two
markets. In the program or entertainment market, they
selltheirprogramtoconsumersforasubscriptionprice.
In the advertising market, they charge an advertising
rate from advertisers for access to different segments of
consumers. The issues we examine are, what is the
optimal subscription price, advertising rate and market
segmentation strategy for the media provider.
We discuss four strategies for the media provider
that are denoted limited access, free access, pooling
and separating. They have distinct segmentation,
pricing and advertising implications. We derive the
optimal implementation of each strategy and suggest
when its use is appropriate.
A key aspect of these strategies is the dual role of
advertising. Not only is advertising a source of rev-
enue for the media provider but it can, in addition, be
used to segment the market. Although advertising is
an annoyance to consumers, it can be used to segment
the market if different consumer segments are willing
to pay different prices for the opportunity to watch the
program at different levels of advertising. As an
example of deliberately using advertisements to
annoy, consider ‘nagware’, shareware that starts and
ends with a screen asking for registration fees (Sha-
piro & Varian, 1999). Customers that are willing to
tolerate the nagging can continue to use the software
for free while other consumers must pay for the
convenience of not being nagged. Similarly, when
downloading a web page, nonsubscribed viewers, in
contrast to subscribers, may have to view advertise-
ment banners blink on and off several times before the
text appears.
This dual role of advertising is particularly relevant
for the separating strategy and its implementation by
contemporary media. A feature present in contempo-
rary electronic media such as the internet and video-
on-demand services, but absent in traditional media
such as newspapers and magazines, is the ability to
flexibly and inexpensively provide consumers with a
choice of different versions of the program so that
they can choose their own comfort level of subscrip-
tion price and advertising. Whereas some of the
strategies we discuss are applicable to traditional
media, the latter feature makes the separating strategy
feasible in electronic media. Furthermore, we are able
to show that the separating strategy is the best strategy
for a broad range of parameters.
From a methodological perspective, the study uses
a two-segment model and analytical methods to
determine conditions under which to use each strat-
egy. The methodology of quality-based price discrim-
ination used in this paper is widely applied. However,
the media provider’s problem is unusual since it can
choose to make the product quality positive or neg-
ative depending on the amount of advertising it
provides with the program. For a typical product,
the quality provided must always be positive or the
customer will not buy it. The firm obviously will not
both pay the customer and give him the product to
take away. Here, the situation is quite different
because the media provider has two potential sources
of revenue, namely, advertisers and subscriptions. As
a result, the strategy space for the media provider is
enlarged because negative valuations by viewers are
possible. The viewer can be paid to consume the
product and yet the firm is the better off for it.
A traditional model of second degree price dis-
crimination for a standard product with two segments
(high and low), whose preferences conform to the
single crossing property, can only generate the subset
of the outcomes where quality is positive. Thus, while
the separating strategy may be possible, parts (ii)–(v)
of Proposition 4 cannot be implemented. Likewise,
only part (i) of the pooling strategy would apply. The
free access strategy would not be implementable at all.
It is the sign of the quality attribute and the second
source of revenue (advertisers) that leads to the other
outcomes being possible. This is the critical aspect of
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existing research.
To conclude, we summarize what this study
accomplishes from a managerial perspective:
  It identifies issues related to balancing the advertis-
ing and subscription revenues that are critical to
both traditional and contemporary media providers,
and to the market for advertising, but that have not
been subjected to prior theoretical investigation
(Section 1).
  It identifies four distinct strategies that the media
provider can pursue, denoted limited access, free
access, pooling and separating (Section 3). These
strategies classify and provide a theoretical basis
and evaluative criteria for schemes seen in prac-
tice. Examples of each strategy are identified in
practice.
  It characterizes the optimal price and advertising
level for the media provider under each strategy
(Propositions 1–4). The conditions under which
pay-per-view or pure advertising supported pro-
gramming is optimal are found (Table 2).
  It finds the profit expressions from which we can
find the strategy that is best for a particular
situation (Propositions 1–4). In particular, we find
that providing options to consumers using the
separating strategy does better than alternative
strategies except under a few specified conditions
(Proposition 5).
In examining the response of customers to differ-
ent levels of advertising, the paper deals with the
impact of information technology and new media on
the future of communications, advertising and pro-
motions. It is not unlikely that the separating pricing
strategies that we discuss here will become more
pervasive with time since contemporary electronic
media make it possible to implement it much more
efficiently than was possible in the past. The impli-
cations are higher profits for media providers, more
choices for customers, and more targeted advertising
for advertisers.
As a suggestion for future research, the effects of
incorporating competition for subscribers may be
examined in more detail by considering two strategic
competitors offering differentiated options catering to
different types of consumers. In addition to competi-
tion from other agents, the effect of competition from
pirated access can also be examined. If piracy exists, it
results in a larger user base but a lower willingness to
pay subscription fees, therefore, it is likely that the
best strategy in a piracy-dominated market is to
depend mainly on advertising revenues.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Maximize P1 ¼ NH½hHðT   aÞþrwð1   a=MÞa 
with respect to a and subject to Mzaz0 and T > a:
ðA1Þ
The first order condition with respect to a is
 hH+rw(1 a/M) arw/M=0. The second order
condition is satisfied. We now have:
(a) If T>M(rw hH)/2rw>0
a ¼ Mðrw   hHÞ=2rw ðA2Þ
paH ¼ð rw þ hHÞ=2 ðA3Þ
P1 ¼ NH½hHT þ Mðrw   hHÞ
2=4rw ð A4Þ
(b) If TVM(rw hH)/2rw
a ¼ T   e;e > 0;e ! 0 ðA5Þ
paH ¼ rwð1   T=MÞð A6Þ
P1 ¼ NHrwTð1   T=MÞð A7Þ
(c) If M(rw hH)/2rwV0
a ¼ 0 ðA8Þ
P1 ¼ NHhHT ðA9Þ
Q.E.D. 5
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Maximize P2 ¼ NL½hLðT   aÞþrwkð1   a=MÞa 
with respect to a and subject to Mzaz0 and T < a:
ðA10Þ
The first order condition with respect to a is  hL+
rwk (1 a/M) arwk/M=0. We get:
(a) If T<M(rwk hL)/2rwk
a ¼ Mðrwk   hLÞ=2rwk ðA11Þ
paH ¼ð rwk þ hLÞ=2 ðA12Þ
P2 ¼ NL½hLT þ Mðrwk   hLÞ
2=4rwk ð A13Þ
(b) If TVM(rw hH)/2rw
a ¼ T þ e;e > 0;e ! 0 ðA14Þ
P2 ¼ NLrwkTð1   T=MÞð A15Þ
Q.E.D. 5
Proof of Proposition 3
Maximize P3 ¼ð NH þ NLÞ½hiðT   aÞþpaaÞ 
w:r:t: a and s:t:Eq: ð4Þ and Mzaz0: ðB1Þ
The first order condition with respect to a is  hi+
pa+apaVV0 c.s. az0. Substituting from Eq. (4), i.e.
pa=rwx[1 a/M] where x ¼ NHþkNL
NHþNL, we obtain the
following results:
a ¼ Mðrwx   hiÞ=2rwx if rwx > hi else 0 ðB2Þ
pa ¼ð rwx þ hiÞ=2 ðB3Þ
From Eq. (B2), it is clear that a(hL)>a(hH) and there
are three possible cases to consider:
(a) If T>a(hL)>a(hH) then ps=VL(T a) and in Eqs.
B(1–4) replace hi with hL.
(b) If a(hL)>a(hH)>T then ps=VH(T a) and in Eqs.
B(1–4) replace hi with hH. Observe that since
a(hH)>T, it must be the case that rwx hH>0
since T>0 by definition.
For both these cases, the second order condition for
maximum is easily verified. Next, substituting all
values into the profit function P3=(NH+NL)[hi(T a)+
paa)], we obtain
P3 ¼ð NH þ NLÞ
  hLT þ





> hi else P3 ¼ð NH þ NLÞhiT ðB4Þ
Now consider what the remaining case a(hL)>T>
a(hH) implies. If we start by assuming ps=hL(T a)
for a<T,w ef i n da>T contradicting our initial
assumption. Similarly, if we start with the assumption
ps=hH(T a) under a>T, we obtain the contradiction
a<T. This leaves the solution a=T in which case
ps=0 and pa=rwx(1 T/M). The profit is
P3 ¼ð NH þ NLÞTrwxð1   T=MÞð B5Þ
Q.E.D. 5
Proof of Proposition 4
We have:









w:r:t: ðpsH;aHÞ and ðpsL;aLÞ; subject to constraints:
ICL : hLðT   aHÞ psHVhLðT   aLÞ psL
ICH : hHðT   aHÞ psHzhHðT   aLÞ psL
IRL : hLðT   aLÞ psLz0
IRH : hHðT   aHÞ psHz0
If an option has higher advertisements, then it must
bethecasethatithasalowerpricethantheotheroption,
and vice versa, otherwise the option with lower
advertising and lower price would dominate for all
types. Mathematically, Sign(aL  aH)=Sign(psH 
psL).
We can show that the low types always see more
advertising, otherwise the ICL and ICH will contradict
each other. Proof: Write ICH: hH(aL aH)zpsH psL,
andICL:hL(aL aH)<psH psL.SinceSign(aL aH)=
Sign(psH psL), it must be that this sign is positive
otherwise hHV
psH psL
aL aH < hL in contradiction to our
assumption that hH>hL. It turns out that imposing the
constraints hH>hL/k and
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rk   hL > 0 are
sufficient in all cases below to ensure aL>aH required
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separation is not possible.
Now consider the following three cases:
Case A: T aL>0(Z T aH>0). We find IRL and ICH
bind.
Case B: T aLV0 and T aHz0. IRL and IRH bind.
Case C: T aH<0Z T aL<0). IRH and ICL bind.
We now examine these cases in detail:
Case A:I R H can be ignored since it is implied by
ICH+IR L.I C H binds: If not, increase psH and profits
rise without any violation of constraints. IRL binds: If
not, increase both psH and psL by the same amount and
profits rise. Thus, we get:
psL ¼ hLðT   aLÞð C1Þ
psH ¼ hHðaL   aHÞþhLðT   aLÞð C2Þ
Inserting Eqs. (C1) and (C2) into the profit
expression to be maximized, and differentiating, we
obtain the following first order conditions:
aH ¼ Mðrw   hHÞ=2rw if rw > hH else 0 ðC3Þ
aL ¼
"
NHðhH   hLÞ
NL
þ rwk   hL
#
M=2rwk ðC4Þ
The required condition for this case to exist is thus,
T >
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rwk   hL
hi
M=2rwk.
Case B: Under the conditions for this case, the
incentive compatibility conditions are always satis-
fied. Hence, the provider leaves no surplus with
either customer type. Thus, IRL and IRH bind. We
have
psL ¼ hLðT   aLÞð C5Þ
psH ¼ hHðT   aHÞð C6Þ
The profit function is P4= NH[hH(T aH)+
rw(1 (aH/M))aH]+NL[hL(T  aL)+rwk(1 (aL/
M))aL]. The first order conditions give:
aH ¼ Mðrw   hHÞ=2rw if rw > hH else 0 ðC7Þ
We can distinguish between three subcases and
the conditions that lead to them:
Case B (i): T aL<0 and T aH>0.
This requires M(rwk hL)/2rwk>T>M
(rw hH)/2rw.
Case B (ii): T aL=0 and T aH>0
This requires aL=T>M(rw hH)/2rw.
Case B (iii): T aL<0 and T aH=0
This requires M(rwk hL)/2rwk>T=a H.
Case C:I R L can be ignored since it is implied by
ICL+IR H.I C L binds, else increase psL and profits rise
without any violation of constraints. IRH binds: If not,
increase both psH and psL by the same amount and
profits rise. Thus, we get:
psH ¼ hHðT   aHÞð C9Þ
psL ¼ hLðaL   aHÞþhHðT   aHÞð C10Þ
Inserting Eqs. (C9) and (C10) into the profit
expression to be maximized, and differentiating, we
obtain the following first order conditions:
aH ¼
NLðhL   hHÞ
NH
þð rw   hHÞ
  
M=2rw; ðC11Þ
aL ¼ð rwk   hLÞM=2rwk: ðC12Þ
The required condition for this case to exist is, T <
NLðhL hHÞ




Proof of Proposition 5
Note that by setting psH= psL=ps and aH=aL=a
where (ps, a) are the optimal pooling solutions, the
problem reduces to the pooling problem and no con-
straints are violated. When psHp psL or aHp aL, the
separating strategy does strictly better. For limited
access versus separating, note that we can replicate
the limited access results by setting psL=0,aL=T,s o
that high types IC is the same as their IR. This reduces
the problem to the limited access problem. However,
the low types continue to contribute advertising rev-
enues in a separating strategy as opposed to a limited
access strategy. Hence, when the separating strategy is
possible, it does strictly better. A similar argument
holds for free access versus separating. aL ¼ð rwk   hLÞM=2rwk if rwk > hL else 0 ðC8Þ
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where separation cannot be maintained. From Propo-
sition 4, we find aH<aL is violated:
(i) When
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rwk   hLV0.
(iii) For M




> T when hH þ
NLðhH hLÞ
NH VhL=k.
Thus, only two constraints
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rwk   hL >
0 and hH>hL/k are required to ensure separation is
better.
For part (ii) of Proposition 5, when
NHðhH hLÞ
NL þ rw
k   hLV0, there is no advertising (i.e. a=0) in all
strategies. Thus, free access cannot be optimal. The
profits from limited access and pooling when there is
no advertising are NHhHT and (NH+NL)hLT, respec-
tively.
For part (iii), we compare the profit expressions
for pooling and free access under hL/kzhH/x. Note
that x ¼ NHþkNL
NHþNL > k (since k<1 is required to ensure
hL/kzhH). Wefind,fromPropositions2and3,thatthe
pooling profit ðNH þ NLÞ½hHT þð Mxðrw   hH=xÞ
2Þ=
ð4rwÞ  , is term-by-term higher than NL½hLTþ
ðMkðrw   hL=kÞ
2=ð4rwÞ , the free access profit.
Q.E.D. 5
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